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Investment in capital, new technology, and agricultural techniques has not been considered 
endeavors worthwhile in a medieval economy because of a lack of strong property rights and no incentive 
on the part of lords and barons to lend money to or grant rights peasant farmers.  Therefore, the medieval 
economy and standards of living at that time often have been characterized as non-dynamic and static due 
to insufficient investment in innovative techniques and technology.  The capital investment undertaken 
typically would have been in livestock, homes, or public investment in canals, bridges, and roads, 
although investment in the latter would have been hindered by a fragmented political system of fiefdoms 
and lack of a unified national government.   During the mercantilism era, these conditions are claimed to 
have improved, although much investment and economic activity are deemed to center around trading and 
small producers.  This paper attempts to demonstrate empirically that a productive and sufficient level of 
public and private investment out of accumulated capital income, taxation, and rents does not have a real 
impact on economic per capita growth until around the 1600s in Britain perhaps due to the beginning of a 
strong, central government, increased property rights as well as to the level of capital, tax, and land 
income achieving an adequate threshold amount.  This would also be about the time of capitalism’s ascent 
as the dominant economic system in England.  Even then, dramatic increases in investment and economic 
growth do not appear until the late 18th Century when investment as a share of the economic surplus 
reaches a sufficient threshold.  According to the heterodox economics and exploratory analysis done in 
this paper, the types of investment, threshold amounts of investment out of profits and rents seem to 
matter when it comes to a growth path raising GDP per capita and net national income to higher levels.   
JEL Codes:  B51, E11, E12, N13  







Early economists were among the first to note how many business establishments and ventures 
took part or all of the proceeds of their profits and used them to buy more property, plant, inventory, and 
equipment if opportunities to expand and earn greater profits existed.  This was in contrast to the way that 
most economic entities operated during feudalism, an economic system that was generally characterized 
as one that lacked the incentives or property rights to encourage producers to re-invest in or add to their 
productive capital (North and Thomas 1971 and 1973, McCloskey 1972, Brenner 1976 and 1985, 
Dimmock 2014). Since the serfs who worked on feudal manors had weak or little ownership in the lands 
they worked, their livestock, and the tools they used, there was little incentive to use any gains from their 
work to try to expand their efforts and output.1 This was especially true during the early middle ages.  
Any production above a level of subsistence for the peasant farmers and their families went to lords and 
barons as surplus, and therefore efforts to invest or innovate were not worthwhile.  There was also little 
incentive for the lords to encourage the serfs to reinvest and innovate since the lords could often coerce 
and gain more output from them through simple intimidation and brute force (Dobb 1947, Brenner 1976 
and 1985).  Additionally, any surplus extracted from the feudal economy was believed to be wasted 
mostly on “unproductive” expenditures by the aristocracy on large palaces, court jesters, minstrels, the 
military, and cathedrals, or items which did not create use value or expand the productive capacity of a 
society by increasing the productivity of a labor force (Baran 1953 and 1957, Engels 1957, Smith 2000).   
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2004) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that 
political institutions shape economic outcomes as opposed to the general Marxian view that economic and 
material circumstances mostly determine political and social institutions.  They argue that the ownership 
of key resources is enabled by legal and political institutions which in turn dictate the dominant mode of 
 
1Sato (2018) points out that claims and rights to land and land usage were multi-layered under feudalism with 
lords holding political power over the land while serfs and other commoners of lower classes had rights to use it 
for subsistence farming, fishing, etc. as long as they shared in the proceeds of their harvests and catches.  He 
argues that it is not until under capitalism that land becomes a commodity and then ownership and rights to land 
revert to just one person or group of owners who are part of one social class.  Multi-layered ownership along class 
lines cease to exist.   
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production.  Therefore, according to them, the lord’s or baron’s legal or political control over land and 
water and water mills gave rise to serfdom and feudalism rather than small scale subsistence farming 
leading to or reinforcing the system of demesnes and feudalism.  The purpose of this paper is not to 
examine which comes first or which is more important but to look at the changes in economic 
circumstances over time while noting some important historical developments in English and British 
history.     
Feudalism was weakened due to less and less arable land being available for food production,   
the trauma of plagues and famines2, and these in turn caused labor shortages and rising labor costs.  As 
agricultural production could not keep up with increases in population due to shortages of arable land, 
small petty producers, merchant traders, and yeoman farmers started taking some of the surplus they 
earned and reinvested it into their operations to finance greater productivity and expansion (Brenner 1976 
and 1985, Heller 2011, Dimmock 2014).  As Colander (2020, 73-75) and others have claimed, some time 
during the 15th Century mercantilism evolved from feudalism thanks to the growth of markets, trading, 
urban areas, global exploration and a larger presence of the government in economic activities through its 
sanctioning of guilds and sponsorship of exploration.  Finally, it was probably not until the Industrial 
Revolution and the ascendancy of manufacturers and major commodities producers that capitalism fully 
replaced mercantilism, although farming in some parts of Europe had already been transformed through 
innovation and greater investment and output (Heller 2011, 89, Colander 2020, 74-75).  
This paper’s empirical research found that it probably was not until the 1600s and through the 
1800s, an era which roughly took in the time periods of the British slave trade, English Agricultural 
Revolution, the English Enclosure Acts, the English Civil War (Revolution), the Glorious Revolution, and 
the Industrial Revolution, that capital income, investment spending, and investment levels began to reach 
a critical threshold of a society’s economic surplus, that is, a society’s cumulative capital income and land 
 




income plus tax revenues (Baran 1957, Baran and Sweezy 1966, Xu 2019, Lambert 2020).3  With this, 
standards of living dramatically began to advance in England and the United Kingdom (UK) with the 
greatest advances being made in the 1800s.  Productive outlets for investment made themselves available 
at this time which helped per capita economic growth, although capital income had to rebound as a share 
of economic surplus and net national income after being lower for several prior centuries (1400s to 
1600s).  If data sources are correct (Clark 2009, Broadberry, et al 2015), capital income and economic 
surplus levels might have been higher in the 13th and 14th Centuries than in the next several centuries and 
did not reach higher levels again until the 1700s in Britain.  See Figures 1 to 3.  Money for investment 
was available in the late medieval period, but because of few incentives for productive investment, it was 
mostly wasted on what some consider unproductive pursuits, and therefore it had little if much impact on 
economic growth.  It is granted that the building of cathedrals and palaces employs many people, yet 
these edifices do not in turn raise the current or future productivity of a nation’s workforce.  In the 
transition period of the 15th to 16th Centuries, investment levels would still be predicted to be low since 
capitalism was still not the predominant economic system as mercantilism and trading still reigned.  High 
labor costs (Clark 2009, Humphries and Weisdorf 2019) for several centuries might have prevented the 
formation of a large enough economic surplus to justify investment too.  In the 17th Century, the 
economic surplus began to grow again thanks to a growth in capital income and a lowering of wages, and 
these events led to the beginning of a more consistent and greater level of capital investment in mostly 
productive endeavors.4,5      
 
3 Stanfield (1974) emphasized one of Baran’s (1957) concepts of the economic surplus as potential output less 
essential consumption of a society to yield potential surplus. Without knowing or being able to estimate slack in 
the British economy from the 13th to 19th Centuries., this paper focuses on Baran’s concept of the actual surplus, 
which is actual output minus essential consumption.   
4 Rimmer, Higgins, and Pollard (1971) assess the year-to-year rates of investment in the 18th and 19th Centuries in 
the UK and estimate it to be slower than other estimates and believe a lot of capital investment undertaken was 
due to the rapid deterioration of many forms of plant and equipment.  They cite the frequency with which 
horseshoes and many farm tools had to be replaced.  Nonetheless, such replacement was necessary to propel 
agricultural output to higher levels, and therefore the investment expenditures were still productive.   
5 The debate over productive versus non-productive pursuits and occupations can be traced at least as far back as 
Adam Smith (2000(1776)).  In general, those commercial and governmental activities and occupations which do 
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(Insert Figures 1 to 3 around here)  
 This paper proceeds as follows.  The next section, Data and Conjectures, describes the data 
sources used in the research for this paper, the definitions of key variables, and the displays of data.  
Finally, a Discussion and Conclusion section discusses the implications of the findings for historical and 
modern economic performance and prospects.   
Data and Conjectures 
 Clark (2009) gives estimates on a yearly basis for a GDP price index, estimates on a decadal basis 
of net capital income (net income from businesses, housing, live-stock, canals, mines, railroads, and so 
on), and estimates of the real rates of return to capital, and capital shares of national income for the years 
1200 to 1860 for England and the UK.  Adjusting capital income according to the price index and using 
the formula 
r = Real Capital Income / Real Capital Stock, 
where r is the real rate of return on capital or capital share of national income, one can rearrange the 
formula and solve for real capital stock using 
Real Capital Stock = Real Capital Income / r 
 
not add or help to create value in the production or distribution of products or services are considered 
unproductive whereas those that do add value are productive.  In an enterprise, workers who design and create a 
product would be considered productive whereas cleaning and bookkeeping personnel, although important, would 
not really be considered productive.  In classical political economy this was an important distinction, and it is still 
considered important to many heterodox economists.  It has mostly been discarded, however, by mainstream and 
neoclassical economists.   
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which can provide some type of general estimates of total English and UK aggregate capital stock 
amounts over the years 1200 to 1860.6,7  Figure 4 illustrates the growth of the estimated real capital stock 
over several centuries, and it is shown that growth in the real capital stock does not really begin to climb 
somewhat until the 17th and 18th centuries with accelerating growth in the 19th century.  Estimated real 
annual net investment expenditures or change in the capital stock from one decade to the next show a 
similar pattern as displayed in Figure 5.8  It appears that investment and capital stock amounts do not 
really begin to be substantive until the 1600s or 1700s, which according to many authors is about the time 
that capitalism becomes the dominant form of economic organization in England or the UK.9  It is around 
1770 to 1780 and beyond when investment begins to climb dramatically (Figure 5), a time period which 
corresponds to the rise of important textile innovations and their implementation in Britain (Caitling 
1986). 
For some years, real net investment is estimated to be negative perhaps because the depreciation 
of capital stock is greater than total investment or due to natural disasters, crop failures, economic 
recession/depression, or war.  If some scholars are correct, then the amounts for net investment in 
productive pursuits should be small from the 13th to the 16th centuries but should grow from the 17th to the 
19th centuries.  In the earlier period, during feudalism, and in the subsequent transition period from 
feudalism to capitalism, economic incentives were either mostly nonexistent or weak whereas in the later 
 
6 Admittedly this is assuming that the real rate of interest is a reward to capital based on capital’s productivity, 
which is a neoclassical economics tenet applied to pre-capitalist and capitalist time periods.  And this neoclassical 
tenet is a debatable concept since it does not address interest rate setting or targeting by lenders or other factors 
that influence interest rates.  However, this is one way to estimate a long run time series of capital stock and 
investment spending over seven centuries absent data about savings rates or profit rates.   
7 Clark also gives the share of capital income in decimal form for each decade as well, and when this is used instead 
of his estimated real returns to capital, charts similar to those in Figures 4 and 5 are obtained.  The author can 
provide these upon request.   
8 Brezis (1995, page 57) gives estimates from Feinstein (1978, 1981) and Feinstein and Pollard (1988) of nominal 
investment in the UK from 18th to 20th centuries.  Although different in magnitude from the estimates for this 
paper, for 1740 to 1860 the Pearson correlation coefficient between Brezis’ estimates and the estimates for this 
paper is +0.933. 
9 The United Kingdom formally came into existence in 1707 thanks to the Treaty of Union between England and 
Scotland although the two states had been unified through a common monarch when James I (James VI of 
Scotland) became King of England around 100 years earlier (Macinnes 2011).   
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period they were much stronger.  Much of the economic surplus of the 13th and 14th Centuries could have 
been saved or spent on military escapades, lavish churches, and/or palaces by the aristocracy.10   
In the years where investment amounts are greater than the economic surplus, and this occurs 
mostly in the 18th and 19th centuries in the estimates, the differences in the amounts possibly can be 
explained by the macroeconomic equation  
S + T = I + G 
where S is national savings, T is national tax revenues, I is investment expenditures, and G is total local 
and national government expenditures (Lippit 1985, Branson 1989).  Since Clark only provides indirect 
taxes in his data files, an estimate of real direct taxes is made using Clark’s indirect tax revenue adjusted 
using his GDP price index (base year = 1860) values to predict real direct tax revenues using a regression 
model based on data on estimated direct and indirect taxes from O’Brien and Hunt (1999).11  
Rearranging the previous equation yields 
S + T - I  = G 
so that when approximated investment is taken from economic surplus (most of which is S), an estimate 
of total government expenditures outside of public capital expenditures can be made.  This estimate is 
probably mostly composed of government operating expenditures since the estimate of I is based upon 
 
10 This paper takes a Post-Keynesian/Kaleckian point of view that almost all wages or labor income is spent on 
consumption and that investment almost entirely comes from upper class income which mostly goes to savings or 
economic surplus (Lavoie 2009)  
11 Predicting their direct taxes using their indirect tax values follows a quadratic regression function which yields 
the best fitting equation.  This equation without the intercept is used with Clark’s (2009) indirect tax values to 
predict corresponding direct tax revenues.  This paper cannot find why Clark has not estimated direct taxes other 
than his estimates of labor, rental, and capital income are all gross estimates and pre-tax.  Clark asserts that 
indirect tax totals are small until late in the 16th Century and that records on taxes are hard to find before the 16th 
Century. It may be fair to speculate that direct taxes make up an even smaller portion of tax revenues during the 
13th to 19th Centuries.  Direct taxes such as national income taxes, wealth and gift taxes are not used to a large 
extent in England and/or the UK until toward the end of 18th and 19th Centuries to finance various wars and are not 
used on a consistent basis until the 20th century (Seely 1995, HM Revenues and Customs, 2010).  The author can 
provide the output for the direct tax estimates as well as all data files used for this paper upon request.     
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Clark’s rate of return on capital which includes return on public investment in tunnels, roads, bridges, and 
ports, and this follows national income accounting methods.  Figure 6 displays estimates of English and 
UK government operating surpluses and deficits over the 1210 to 1860 period in which government 
spending is normally in surplus until the late 18th Century and beyond.12  Much of this could be for 
military expenditures (Britain was in many wars and armed conflicts in the 18th and 19th Centuries), and 
data from Mitchell (1988, pages 578-580) shows a disproportionate amount of British net public 
expenditures from 1688 to 1801 to be for the army, navy, or ordnance with a low of 20% to a maximum 
of 96% and an average of 45%.  Barro (1987) writes that most of Britain’s deficits during the period of 
1701 to 1918 comes from spending on wars with the exception of a budget deficit incurred to buy the 
freedom of slaves from slave owners in 1835-1836 and in a dispute over income taxes during 1909-1910.  
Barro’s Figure 8 in his paper which plots public debt as a percentage of GDP looks very similar to Figure 
6 in this paper because he mostly relies on the Mitchel data.13  Finally Figure 7, using Mitchell’s data, 
shows UK net public debt as a percentage of GDP from 1692 to 1860 accelerating during the 18th and 19th 
Centuries.14   
Using investment levels or capital stock estimates from the Clark (2009) data, one can calculate a 
Baran Ratio (Xu 2019, Lambert 2020) which shows the amount of investment on a yearly basis that 
comes out of a society’s economic surplus, which in this case is the sum of Clark’s capital and land 
 
12 The author could not find definitive sources for English and UK budget deficits and surpluses before 1800, 
although estimates of net public debt can be found from Mitchell (1988) and Chantrill (no date) that go back to 
1692.  The surplus and deficit estimates that are calculated in this paper have a +0.8825 correlation coefficient 
with the inflation adjusted debt (base year of 1860 using Clark’s price index) estimates from Mitchell when 
correlated on a decadal basis from 1700 to 1860.  As deficits increased so did corresponding debt levels.  The 
furthest Mitchell’s data goes back in time appears to be 1688, usually 1692.     
13 Interestingly one thing that Barro finds is that as long as currency could be converted to gold, money supply 
growth and inflation are not problems resulting from the budget deficits or the temporary rises in government 
spending mostly due to military spending.  He claims that such deficits are associated with increases in long term 
interest rates, however, except for the deficits associated with the slave buy out and the income tax dispute. In 
those two cases, long term rates do not rise.   Clark (2001) in estimating deficits from the 1720s to the 1830s finds 
no “crowding out” effects of British deficits.  Figure A1 in the appendix also plots his estimates of real interest rates 
from 1200 to 1860.        
14 Esteban (2001) writes that the French wars would have been very difficult for Britain to finance had it not been 
for trade credits from India.   
9 
 
income estimates plus taxes collected by the state.  If overseas borrowing is undertaken to finance 
investment (or perhaps a capital account surplus or treasure/loot from overseas exploration/conquest or 
war or trading in slaves15 are used to finance it), then the Baran Ratio can be greater than one.  Xu (2019) 
labels this the Baran Ratio since the economist Paul Baran (1953 and 1957) believes that capital 
formation comes out of the economic surplus.  Simply put on a yearly basis, 
Baran Ratio = Investment / Economic Surplus . 
 Xu (2019) believes that Baran’s concept of the economic surplus is important in 
understanding investment in a capitalist economy because investment spending can only come from the 
surplus generated from labor.  That is, profits, gains, and rents earned by owners or landlords and the 
taxes collected by a government come mostly if not entirely from the labor employed in capitalist 
enterprises or farms.  It is not until the Baran Ratio reaches a critical and sustained level that economic 
growth and higher levels of development can be attained.  This could mostly occur when capitalism 
becomes the dominant economic system thanks to greater property rights.  Figure 8 displays the decadal 
pattern of the Baran Ratio, which as can be seen in the diagram does not begin to increase until late in the 
16th Century.  And it is not until after 1770 that the Baran Ratio shows consistent and substantive 
increases in magnitude, a period long after the proliferation of greater property rights brought about by 
the English Civil War / Revolution and the Glorious Revolution. Figure 5 shows a similar pattern when it 
comes to real investment amounts.   
(Insert Figures 4 to 8 and Tables 1 and 2 around here) 
 Table 1 shows a Pearson correlation coefficient matrix among the variables real economic 
surplus per head, real investment per head, real government surpluses/deficits per head, the Baran Ratio, 
Clark’s estimates of real income-based GDP per head, Broadberry, et al’s estimates of real output-based 
 
15 Richardson (1987) and Etlis and Richardson (2008), among other scholars, estimate that the British slave trade of 
the 17th to 19th Centuries had a big impact on British economic growth.    
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GDP per head and net public debt as a percentage of GDP (Mitchell 1988 and Chantrill n,d,) for the years 
1200 to 1860.  All coefficients are statistically significant at an alpha of 5% and show moderate to strong 
correlations.  More importantly, the amount of real economic surplus per capita, real investment per 
capita, and the Baran Ratio are positively and moderately correlated with Clark’s income based real GDP 
per capita measurement and are strongly and positively associated with the Broadberry, et al output based 
real GDP per capita estimates.16   Real government surpluses per capita are negatively and moderately 
correlated with Clark GDP per capita estimates and strongly and negatively correlated with real 
investment per capita, the Baran Ratio and the Broadberry, et al real GDP per capita values.  The greater 
the real government surplus (net total local and national tax revenues less spending), the lower real 
investment, the Baran Ratio and the lower the real GDP per capita on average.  Conversely, the greater 
the deficit, the higher values of these variables on average.17  Finally, net public debt as a percentage of 
GDP is strongly correlated with the economic surplus and moderately and positively correlated with the 
two measurements of GDP per capita, real investment, and the Baran ratio.  It is inversely and moderately 
correlated with government surpluses/deficits in that larger deficits (negative numbers) correspond to 
larger debt percentage numbers which are all greater than zero.    
 Table 2 displays the Pearson correlation coefficients for the same variables for the period 
1600 to 1860.18  All coefficients have the same signs as in Table 1 and are statistically significant, yet the 
 
16 There is of course a simultaneous relationship among many of these variables with investment not only leading 
to higher real output/income per capita, but the latter also leads to higher investment, consumption, etc., in turn.  
That is, a feedback loop exists among investment and output.   
17 The high negative correlation between investment per capita and government surpluses/deficits per capita is not 
surprising, of course, since surpluses/deficits were derived by taking the economic surplus minus investment 
estimates.   
18 Scatterplots and Chow tests (Chow 1960) show 1600 to be a point indicating some type of a break in the pattern 
of the data.  Chow tests are done for bivariate, two stage least squares regression analysis, and these results can 
be provided upon request.  Since data for net public debt as a percentage of GDP is available from 1692 and 
forward, the coefficients for it do not differ for those from Table 1.  The Appendix shows scatterplots of both 
Clark’s and Boradberry et al’s measurements of output per capita as y variables with the other variables listed in 
Tables 1 and 2 as x variables.  In some of these scatterplots a linear trend really does not develop until the x and y 
paired values reach a date either in the late 1500s or early 1600s.  The year 1600 is also the year that Clark (2007) 
notes is a point of departure for Britain in showing gains in productivity and efficiency in its economy versus 
virtually no economic growth in previous centuries.   
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magnitudes of the coefficients are now larger and stronger.  The only exception is for the net public debt 
as a percentage of GDP variable because it only has values from 1700 to 1860 as in Table 1.  The results 
in Table 2 show that economic surplus per capita, real investment per capita, the Baran ratio, and the 
surplus/deficit per capita have a stronger impact during a period in which property rights were 
strengthened during the 17th Century and later.  Yet perhaps more importantly during this period greater 
amounts from the economic surplus are reinvested into the British economy, and greater deficits and debt 
levels are undertaken by  
Keynes discussed an investment multiplier and how it affected consumption and employment 
(248-249) and noted the consequences of savings being greater than investment in the macroeconomy 
resulting in less than full employment and stagnation.  Or, in the minds of Sweezy (1942) and Baran and 
Sweezy (1966), and similar to Keynes (1964 (1936)), not enough of all of the economic surplus generated 
by an economy was absorbed by investment opportunities, and so the economy often tended toward 
recession or stagnation as 
δ  I / δ t > δ C / δ t 
where the rate of consumption (C) over time (t) began to fall behind the rate of investment (I) over time 
(Sweezy 1942, 186-189).  Some heterodox economists contend that Keynes argued that the 
disequilibrium between savings and investment as well as the gap between actual and full employment 
and between actual and potential real GDP could not only last in the short run but also into the long run 
and could be the usual state of affairs in a capitalist economy (Lavoie 2009, Marglin 2018) .  If so, 
although we have no real records of unemployment or underemployment and potential real GDP in 
England and the UK during the time period covered in the research for this paper, and although feudalism 
and mercantilism are different economic systems than capitalism, it has been shown that the greater the 
level of investment expenditures and the greater the Baran Ratio, the greater the real GDP per capita and 
the greater the economic growth.  The slow growth or no-net-growth or static Malthusian economic 
systems of feudalism and mercantilism perhaps could be argued to be a long run equilibrium that is 
12 
 
finally transformed by the right type and right levels of investment under appropriate institutional 
settings.  Using an “old post-Keynesian” or Cambridge growth equation (Lavoie 2009, 108-109) 
r = g / s 
where “r” is the profit rate or rate of return to capital, “g” is the economic growth rate, and “s” is the 
propensity to save out of profits, and it is assumed that workers either do not save or save very little out of 
total savings, then rearranging we have 
g = s*r 
  If it is assumed that savings = investment then “s” can be considered the Baran Ratio in this paper, 
and “r” is the return to capital estimated by Clark (2009).  Calculating the growth rates over the centuries 
on a decadal basis and using the last formula, Figure 9 shows that growth rates do not really become that 
large and consistently positive in value until the late 16th and most of the 17th Centuries, the centuries during 
which capitalism supposedly becomes dominant.  Prior to this time, growth rates appear to vary widely 
under feudalism and then tend to vary less so during the mercantilism era.  Up until 1600, this paper 
estimates that the average growth rate is around 0%, and then thereafter, it is around 5.6% over the decades, 
which somewhat supports the econometric work of Crafts and Mills (2017).  More so, the growth rate over 
the decades from 1780 to 1860 is around 10.8%. 
(Insert Figure 9 around here) 
An Example:  Investing in Horses Versus Oxen 
As an illustration of how investment opportunities and levels of investment mattered during each 
time period, Figure 10 shows estimates for the number in millions of oxen and horses used in England 
and Britain from 1221 to 1496 and then from 1550 to 1870 (Broadberry, et al 2015).19  Although the 
 
19 The authors omitted the period of 1497 to 1549 because of a lack of historical records and difficulties in coming 
up with accurate estimates.   
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choice of and employment of horses or oxen by farmers had something to do with terrain and climate 
considerations (Langdon 1982 and 1986, Broadberry, et al 2015), a principal consideration was the cost of 
maintaining and keeping each type of animal (Langdon 1982 and 1986).  Despite the versatility of the 
horse, oxen were cheaper to feed, and when no longer useful or when the price of beef was high, could be 
sold or used for food.  Horses were sometimes considered a luxury during early medieval times, and so 
oxen with their low costs were usually preferred for tilling or plowing soil.  It was not until the peasantry 
gained some independence and became somewhat innovative through producing for markets rather than 
just for lords; not until some farms became larger during the enclosure movement; and not until 
agricultural markets became larger and wider geographically during the 16th and 17th centuries that the 
horse became more useful despite its higher operating costs.  The horse became more useful in not only 
farming but more importantly in hauling and transporting agricultural output to markets which had 
become geographically larger versus than what had existed under the old demesne system (Langdon 1982 
and 1986).  Langdon (1982 and 1986) argued that as some peasant farmers came to possess amounts of 
land and output and hence, greater affluence, they could afford to make the investment in the more costly 
yet more productive and multifaceted horse.  In other words, they surplus the accrued had to reach a 
critical level before the horse became a viable asset.     
In calculating Pearson correlation coefficients between the ratio of horse to oxen from 1221 to 
1496 and the Baran Ratio and real annual investment for this period, Table 3 indicates little or no 
relationship between the two investment measurements and the ratio of horse to oxen.  However, the 
relationships are statistically significant and fairly strong for the period 1550 to 1859 as would be 
expected to be following Langdon’s reasoning for the ascent of the horse.  Perhaps one scenario is that 
changing conditions in going from a mostly feudalistic to a mercantilistic and then to a mostly capitalistic 
economic system saw innovation and investment by yeoman peasant farmers, which in turn expanded 
markets further, and then this in turn let to greater income and investment opportunities by such farmers.  
14 
 
Economic traditions and conditions changed as did the level of investment associated with it to spur on 
economic development. 
(Insert Figure 10 around here) 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The results of this exploratory research paper are based upon estimates made from historical 
records reviewed by and extended by economic historians using different techniques.  The data are 
examined through heterodox economic theories and points of view.  One limitation of the results found in 
this paper is that during the time periods examined not nearly as many complete and thorough economic 
records existed then as they do in modern times.  Some claim that Clark and his data are influenced by a 
Malthusian point of view of medieval times whereas Broadberry, et al see this time period as less 
stagnant.  Yet, general estimates from these two of the most comprehensive sources of British economic 
history have to suffice in order to do any type of economic and quantitative analyses of the time period 
that covers the transition from feudalism to capitalism, although the data used is based upon after the fact 
reconstruction of certain events.   
Nonetheless, if the estimates are reasonably accurate, the results found in this paper lend some 
credence to various arguments regarding the transition from feudalism to mercantilism to capitalism.  
That economic surplus, investment, investment rates, government spending and debt are largely 
ineffective or too small before the 17th or 18th centuries to impact standards of living or real GDP per 
capita is supported by the correlation results.  This bolsters the work of Crafts and Mills (2017) which 
argues that trend growth in England and the UK up until the industrial revolution basically hovered 
around zero and support Clark’s (2007) writings on how the general economic efficiency and productivity 
of the British economy was basically static until 1600.20  As Clark (2001) noted, government deficits had 
 
20 Graphs of real GDP per capita using the Clark and Broadberry et al data showed pretty much a flat line trend 
pretty much during both feudalistic and mercantilistic (or transition period) epochs.   
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no crowding out effects on the economy of the 1700s and 1800s, and one could speculate that the deficits 
actually had a “crowding in” effect on British economic growth given the results of the analysis of this 
paper.     
One could also argue that the type and level of investment also mattered.  If Baran is correct, then 
a lot of the economic surplus would have been wasted in the 13th and 14th centuries when feudalism was 
still the dominant form of the economic system.  Even with feudalism in decline in subsequent centuries, 
some of the economic surplus may have been “wasted” by the aristocracy on cathedrals, palaces, and wars 
rather than spent on productive machinery and tools or on ports, canals and roadways.  Various authors 
have noted that traders and merchants during the mercantilist era improved transportation technology but 
did not contribute much to changes in productive technology (Sweezy 1976 (1950)).  As Brenner (1985) 
notes, medieval and mercantile era guilds, through their monopoly power, also frustrated investment in 
innovative techniques, and it was not until petty producers came along that this began to change.  He also 
writes that until larger farms came about along with the development of large pastoral land holdings, it 
was difficult for many yeoman farmers to innovate on smaller parcels of land.  Larger land holdings and 
more advanced farming techniques yielded greater economies of scale than the typical smaller, medieval 
farms that featured mostly subsistence style farming (Brenner 1985, Heller 2011, Cockshot 2019).  
Feudalism, mercantilism and their institutions only slowly gave way to capitalism as capitalism was built 
on the “ruins” of previous economic systems as those who were forced to leave common farm areas 
became the workers of the early manufacturers of the industrial revolution (McCloskey 1972, Marx and 
Engels 2004 (1848)).  Property rights, investment, and global trade were established before the late 18th 
Century, but large gains were not seen in real GDP per capita until 1780 and beyond as this paper shows. 
Perhaps property rights are a necessary but not sufficient condition for economic development and 
takeoff.  Just as important factors are the levels of public and private sector investments that need to reach 
a certain level before real economic growth occurs. 
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For those readers familiar with the Dobby-Sweezy debate (Dobb 1947, Sweezy 1976 (1950) 
among many other publications) as well as the Brenner debate (Brenner 1976, Brenner 1985, Heller 1985, 
Heller 2011 among many others), the statistical findings of this paper are probably not surprising since 
many of these authors note the stagnation of most of the medieval period and economic decline in the late 
medieval period in Europe.  They also note the slow and gradual transition from feudalism to 
mercantilism and then to capitalism and the takeoff of economic growth with the agricultural and 
industrial revolutions.  This paper’s findings also somewhat support the writings of those who emphasize 
the importance of property rights for investment and economic advancement in that such rights were not 
strong enough for advancement until around the 16th and 17th centuries (North and Thomas 1971 and 
1973, McCloskey 1972).   
From a theoretical perspective, the investment spending alone and also as a share of the economic 
surplus probably resonated in the period of 1600 and beyond, especially 1780 and beyond, when the 
British textile industry took off because spending from surplus was not wasted as much as during 
feudalism and mercantilism and instead was invested in many of the new innovations introduced during 
the periods of the English Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions.  Political and property rights reforms 
over the centuries such as those under Oliver Cromwell and from the Glorious Revolution also mattered.  
These innovations boosted average labor productivity (which helped to save on high wage labor 
expenses) which in turn boosted standards of living.  The opportunities were perhaps fewer or almost 
non-existent in feudalism, and although mercantilism saw investment in large cargo vessels, ports, and 
increases in land holdings, these investments did not create as many other additional investment outlets 
and new markets as did manufacturers during the Industrial Revolution.  The transportation, wholesaling 
and retailing industries along with the guilds during the mercantile era did not have as great of an impact 
on employment and productivity as did the rise of the industrialists.  A manufacturing plant employed 
many people and depended upon supply networks which also typically employed large numbers of 
people.  Some type of multiplier effect was probably able to attain an impactful result once such 
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innovations and industries with so many linkages developed.  Finally, as classical economists like Smith 
and Marx and later the neo-Marxists Baran (1953 and 1957) and Baran and Sweezy (1966) noted, some 
forms of business could be claimed to be “productive” and others as “unproductive” or wasteful.  They 
claimed that much of finance, retailing, wholesaling, advertising, military expenditures, R&D efforts on 
packaging and design, etc. in a capitalist economy are all wasteful and really do not contribute that much 
to a society’s economic net welfare.  On the other hand, “productive” industries included those in 
manufacturing, mining, agriculture, education, etc. in which the populace gains something tangible and 
useful from the consumption of their products or services.  Therefore, not only do innovation and 
investment matter, but also the type of investment in innovation (productive versus unproductive) could 
matter in addition to the property rights and strong national government presence needed to secure the 
rights of ownership and to profits. 
Schumpeter in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (2003 (1943)) noted how that the 
economies that preceded capitalism were like a circular flow system of trading of exchange that remained 
static and never really expanded.  It was only with innovation under capitalism that the circular flow 
expanded and grew thanks to waves and cycles of innovation.  For Schumpeter, early in capitalism 
entrepreneurs sought investment for their ideas in order to make a profit.  In the General Theory 
(1964(1936)), Keynes indicated that job creation during an economic downturn could be done through 
unproductive activities such as burying treasury notes in bottles and having workers dig them back up 
again (129) although he conceded that it would be better to have people employed in more productive 
activities and through greater levels of some type of investment even if it meant the “socialization” of 
some investment.  British governmental operating deficits and net public debt grew substantially probably 
due to military and warfare expenditures, which are unproductive uses of resources in some minds (Baran 
and Sweezy 1966, Mohun 1994, Lambert and Kwon 2015).21   
 
21 Although Baran and Sweezy emphasized that it was World War II that eventually lifted the US out of the Great 
Depression and restored full capacity utilization and full employment.   
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Much has been written about the post-World War II economic boom in the United States and in 
other advanced capitalistic nations that lasted until around the 1970s.  This lack of reinvestment could 
also be showing up in declining rates of productivity increases in the US economy and a usual and 
persistent gap between actual and potential real GDP since the late 1970s.  Before the 1970s, the US 
economy often achieved or exceeded potential real GDP, yet afterward it often fell short.22  Piketty and 
Goldhammer (2014), among others, notes that much of global inequality in modern times may be due to 
slow economic growth that favors owners of capital over workers.  One way to remedy inequality is to 
have a global wealth tax that would put its proceeds to work in areas such as health care, housing, 
education and other human capital building programs.  Wrenn (2010) argues that much of the economic 
surplus could be used to expand productive capacity throughout an economy since in a monopoly 
capitalistic society too much excess capacity always exists.   
A lack of reinvestment would limit surplus absorption according to Baran and Sweezy (1966) 
unless more was spent on unproductive activities such as advertising, marketing, the industries of 
retailing or finance, insurance or real estate, etc.  However, these activities do not increase the productive 
capacity of a society (just as feudalism’s extravagant spending did not expand its capacity for output) and 
so may not help the long-term resiliency of an economic system through helping to develop it 
productivity and output per worker, which in turn help to raise its standard of living.  If such productive 
reinvestment does not or cannot occur through private markets, then some Keynesian economists would 
argue that it can occur through greater governmental spending on public works, education, and health 
care.  On the other hand, in order to raise worker productivity, government policy could also take a less 
generous stance by refusing to enlarge infrastructure and social welfare programs and by giving 
employers more leeway in extracting more work and less pay from their workers.  The latter would be 
 
22 Some have claimed that there can be too much investment and cite the former USSR as an example of a society 
which undertook too much investment at the expense of consumer goods.  However, Cockshot (2019) disputes 
this and cites other works which claim that much of what was counted as investment in the USSR was actually 
military expenditures.  In national income accounting, such expenditures are often counted as governmental 
expenditures.   
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somewhat akin to what the nobility often did to the serfs during the decline of feudalism.  If capitalism 
has been struggling since the Great Recession to achieve greater levels of surplus absorption, then it has 
two alternatives.  It can either allow for greater socialization of investment or it can engage in greater 
worker exploitation.  The former implies a transition to a greater level of socialism within capitalism, the 
latter implies a course toward a certain degree of repression within a capitalistic system.  Perhaps the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism illustrates that investing more of the surplus in the most 
productive ways (private or public) is the answer to increasing standards of living and economic growth 
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Source: From B.R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics (1988) and Christopher Chantrill (no date) UK Public Spending, 
https://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/  
 
Source: Estimates based on Gregory Clark, “National Income, Prices, Wages, Land Rents, Population, England, 1209-1869”, 















































































































































































































































































































Figure 8:  Baran Ratio
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Real Economic Surplus per Head 1       
Real Investment per Head 0.4357* 1      
Real Govt Surpluses/Deficits per Head -0.2991* -0.9892* 1     
Baran Ratio 0.3851* 0.9739* -0.9698* 1    
Clark Real Income per Head 0.7312* 0.4032* -0.3084* 0.3495* 1   
Broadberry, et al Real GDP per Head 0.7329* 0.8195* -0.7875* 0.7304* 0.5295* 1  
Debt/GDP Pct 0.6900* 0.5386* -0.5116* 0.5034* 0.5489* 0.4993* 1 
 




























Real Economic Surplus per Head 1       
Real Investment per Head 0.8809* 1      
Real Government Surpluses/Deficits per Head -0.8511* -0.9982* 1     
Baran Ratio 0.8202* 0.9817* -0.9856* 1    
Clark Real Income per Head 0.9605* 0.8779* -0.8526* 0.8040* 1   
Broadberry, et al Real GDP per Head 0.9235* 0.8261* -0.7998* 0.7455* 0.9699* 1  
Debt/GDP Pct 0.6900* 0.5386* -0.5116* 0.5034* 0.5489* 0.4993* 1 
 


















Source: Adapted from Broadberry, et al (2015), Figure 2.01, page 54 and from the data from the website  































































































































































































































































































































Table 3—Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Horse to Oxen Ratio 
 
        Real Annual Investment, 1221 to 1496 Baran Ratio, 1221 to 1496 
Ratio of Horse to Oxen, 1221 to 1496  0.054   -0.028   
           
        Real Annual Investment, 1550 to 1859 Baran Ratio, 1550 to 1859 
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